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REGRESAR

General Debate: United Nations Conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination.-Topic 3: Institutional Arrangements

Intervention by Minister María Paula Mac Loughlin

March 31

Madam Chair,

The Argentine delegation joins previous delegations in congratulating you for the excellent manner in which you have conducted the work of this Conference in its first week of negotiations and extends them to the other members of the Bureau.

In addition, the Argentine Delegation takes this opportunity to thank the valuable technical and conceptual contributions of academia and civil society in the interactive dialogue of yesterday, and we commend that initiative.

In this segment of the debate, in order to be brief and not to be reiterative, regarding the proposals made this morning, the Argentine Delegation will focus on an issue that it considers of central interest, that of the protection of the pre-existing regime, that must be ensured through institutional arrangements.

To do this, we propose the following elements:

(1) That all signatory States to the Prohibition Treaty be parties to the NPT and the CTBT.
(2) That they are in full and complete compliance with their provisions, ie that the IAEA Board of Governors and / or the United Nations Security Council have not determined that the State is in violation of its commitments to the NPT and its safeguards agreements with the IAEA.
(3) To include specific language and measures to clarify the relationship with the NPT, CTBT and FMCT, and in particular:
(4) A provision indicating that the Prohibition Treaty in no way exceeds or alters the obligations of the NPT.
(5) Explicit reaffirmation of all contracting parties that will continue to observe all their obligations and commitments under the NPT and CTBT.
(6) Express recognition that the State party to the Prohibition Treaty cannot be opposed to support a withdrawal from the NPT.
(7) An explicit commitment to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime, in particular by facilitating the early entry into force of the CTBT and the negotiation of the FCTC.
(8) A clear statement that the Prohibition Treaty does not replace or diminish the obligation of nuclear disarmament set out in Article VI of the NPT.
(9) A clear statement that the Prohibition Treaty does not absorb, replace, or is equivalent or comparable to any of the obligations contained in the NPT.

Thank you very much.